Code loaded later can change the security scope of a reviewed release package. Source verification, privilege boundaries and store requirements belong in that design.
Evaluation approach
Assess the code's origin, signature, storage location and loading authority. The update channel and RASP coverage need a consistent trust model.
Application example
In an application that downloads plugins, assess verification against the content that will actually be used, rather than checking only at download time.
Limits and considerations
Downloading over HTTPS does not make incorrect or modified code trustworthy.
The origin of code loaded later
Dynamic loading can separate the scope reviewed at build time from the code actually executing at runtime. Establish the loaded content's origin, integrity and update authority. HTTPS transport does not answer every content-authorization question.
Include failed downloads, old versions, incomplete files and rollback in the test plan. Ask the RASP vendor how much of this code it covers. Keep added modules in the security inventory and assess compliance with the platform's distribution requirements separately.
Checks and decisions
- Inventory dynamic modules
- Verify code origin
- Question protection coverage
Secure transport alone is insufficient; verify that the code comes from an authorized origin.
Sources
The primary references above provide the technical basis. Example workflows and evaluation suggestions are this publication’s explanations, not independent test results for a particular product.