The bridge between WKWebView and the native application determines which web content receives which privileges. Model this boundary explicitly in an iOS protection review.
Evaluation approach
Define which origin may access each native capability. User input, redirects and file access do not all have the same trust level.
Application example
Do not give a WebView displaying external support content a bridge for payment approval or key operations.
Limits and considerations
A trusted initial URL does not make every subsequent page trustworthy.
A narrow interface between web and native code
When WKWebView content can invoke privileged application operations, bridge methods form a security boundary. Explain which source can call each command and how parameters are validated. RASP does not automatically define this contract.
Test origin changes during navigation and external links. Starting from a trusted address does not prove that later content retains the same trust level. Continue enforcing final authorization for sensitive operations on the server.
Checks and decisions
- Verify origins
- Constrain message schemas
- Control external navigation
Check origin, message schema and server authorization separately.
Sources
The primary references above provide the technical basis. Example workflows and evaluation suggestions are this publication’s explanations, not independent test results for a particular product.