WebView introduces a separate content and execution boundary inside an application. Security assessment should cover URL validation, redirects, JavaScript and native bridges together.
Evaluation approach
Inventory JavaScript bridges, allowed addresses and file access. Untrusted content must not gain native privileges.
Application example
A WebView displaying a help page does not need access to payment or key APIs. Restrict bridges to their intended purpose.
Limits and considerations
Even if the initial page is trusted, redirects or embedded content may come from another origin.
Privileges granted to web content
Not every address loaded in a WebView has the same trust level. JavaScript bridges, file access and redirects create critical boundaries. RASP protection of the host application does not automatically make the loaded page's business logic trustworthy.
Specify which origins may call each bridge method and which parameters are accepted. Unexpected navigation or an external link must not gain access to privileged application functions. Validating only the initial URL does not complete these controls.
Checks and decisions
- Narrow bridge access
- Check origins
- Open external links separately
Expose only the native privileges required for the web content's task.
Sources
The primary references above provide the technical basis. Example workflows and evaluation suggestions are this publication’s explanations, not independent test results for a particular product.