Writing an integrity requirement and assessing tampering in a final package are separate tasks. Acceptance evidence should show detection and critical-operation outcomes together.
Evaluation approach
Signing, package integrity and runtime code changes are different layers. State which are tested. A correct source revision does not verify the file received by users.
Application example
Compare the store-installed application, protected laboratory package and server-approved version list. If an unexpected package succeeds, the flow fails acceptance even if an event was logged.
Limits and considerations
OS signature checks and application self-checks sit at different trust boundaries. Account for the ability to modify local checks.
Checks and decisions
- Record distribution channels
- Link package and policy versions
- Test server acceptance
Assess integrity beyond installation. Define which evidence is used during critical operations and how fresh it must be.
Sources
The primary references above provide the technical basis. Example workflows and evaluation suggestions are this publication’s explanations, not independent test results for a particular product.